This paper examines the importance of annuity
Introduction
Pension annuities offer retirees a simple vehicle for insuring themselves against the risk of outliving their retirement savings. As the U.S. workplace retirement system shifts to defined contribution (DC) pensions with lump-sum payouts, it seems logical to think retirees will shift their retirement savings portfolios towards annuity products in order to replace the guaranteed life income payouts that were once provided by old fashioned, defined benefit (DB) pensions.
Such a shift has yet to occur, however. Only a very small percentage of older workers and recent retirees with DC-type pensions has purchased or intends to purchase an annuity with their retirement savings. Economists and experts on insurance agree that annuities can play a key role in providing stable retirement income that lasts for the lifetime of retired workers and their spouses (Yaari 1965; Davidoff, Brown and Diamond 2005) . When retirees are uncertain about how long they will live, the purchase of a life annuity can assure them of receiving a specified monthly income up through the age of death. After savings are converted into an annuity, workers and their survivors are no longer required to make decisions about how their retirement savings are invested and the annual drawdown rate from their savings. Many economists think savers with average or above-average life expectancy should convert much of their retirement savings into an annuity within a few years of retirement In spite of the advantages of annuity payouts, the percentage of retirees who purchase annuities is small. Based on her analysis of the 2006 Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) data files, Pashchenko (2010) estimates that less than 8 percent of Americans 70 and older report receiving income from a private annuity. Many explanations have been offered for the very small share of retirees who buy annuities. One partial explanation is that most retirees already receive a large fraction of their retirement income in annuity-like payments. Another is that many Americans near retirement have not accumulated enough financial assets to make it worthwhile to purchase an annuity.
This paper uses income and asset data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) as well as aggregate data from historical data bases to examine the trend in retirement income that is paid out as annuities. Our analysis tracks annuitization rates in different parts of the income distribution to determine whether too little annuitization has caused an important welfare loss for retirees. Our basic result is easy to summarize. We find surprisingly little evidence that regular pension or annuity income has shrunk in relation to other sources of old-age income. According to the reports of people interviewed in both the CPS and SCF surveys, the share of old-age income derived from pensions and annuities has increased since the early 1980s, the heyday of DB pension plan enrollment in the U.S. workplace. We confirm this result using broader measures of income than the standard money income measure used by the Census Bureau and Federal Reserve Board in their analyses of the same surveys. Two of the most important income items missing in the money income definition are health insurance coverage and the flow of housing services obtained by homeowners by virtue of occupying a dwelling that they own. Inclusion of these income items in household income strengthens our conclusion that more secure kinds of retirement income have increased rather than declined since DB pension enrollment began its long decline.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents evidence on the declining role of DB pensions in workplace retirement savings. Section 2 describes the household survey data we use and evaluates its quality relative to alternative sources of information on household income. Section 3 describes our analytical procedures and lays out our main results using standard money income measures. This section also presents results using alternative income measures that count the value of health insurance and returns on homeowner equity to aged families. We also show the impact of excluding aged households containing a full-time working breadwinner from the analysis. Section IV presents simulation estimates of the impact of annuitizing the financial wealth holdings of the aged population. If households annuitized all their financial wealth, the current money incomes of many families would rise, often by a substantial amount. However, this would have a very limited effect on the lowincome aged, who only rarely have meaningful amounts of financial wealth. The paper concludes with a brief summary and a discussion of possible explanations for our basic findings.
Decline in pension coverage under defined benefit plans
Over the past three decades, the proportion of American workers covered by a traditional DB pension plan shrank noticeably. The drop occurred for three main reasons. Workers are now less likely to be offered a pension plan at work than was the case at the end of the 1970s ( Figure   1 ). Among government employers the erosion in the pension offer rate has been slight. The decline has been larger in the private sector. In addition, workers employed in private industry are now less likely to work for an employer who offers a plan. Workers are also somewhat less likely to be enrolled in a plan even if pension coverage is offered at their place of work. One reason is that enrollment in many DC plans, including 401(k) and 403(b) plans, is voluntary.
Workers who do not elect to make voluntary tax-preferred contributions to many plans are excluded from participation.
A second reason for the falloff in DB coverage is that employment in private industry has increased faster than it has in the public sector. DB pension plans have always been more common (and generous) in federal, state, and local government agencies than among private employers. Finally, for a variety of reasons private employers that offer pension coverage have shifted out of DB plans and into DC plans, most notably 401(k) plans. Clark and Monk (2006) and Butrica et al. (2009) summarize some reasons for the shift. Among private sector workers with a pension plan, the fraction who are enrolled solely in a DB plan fell from 62 percent in 1979 to just 7 percent in 2011 ( Figure 2 ). Many employees, especially in the private sector, are eligible to enroll in both a DB and DC employer-sponsored plan. If we count the workers enrolled in both types of plan plus those enrolled solely in a DB plan, 84 percent of pensionenrolled private employees were in a DB plan in 1979 compared to only 31 percent in 2011.
Thus, about 7 out of every 10 private-sector workers covered by a workplace pension now receive coverage solely under a DC plan.
The shift in private employer pensions away from DB and toward DC plans can also be seen in the asset holdings of the two kinds of plans. Figure 3 shows the division of total private pension fund assets between DB and DC plans over the period from 1975 through 2011. At the end of the 1970s, over 70 percent of private employer pension fund assets backed the benefit claims of DB plans. By 2011, this fraction had dipped below 30 percent of total fund assets.
An overwhelming majority of DC plans provide retirement savings payouts in the form of lump-sum distributions. Comparatively few offer the option of payouts as life annuity payments (Mitchell 2000) . As a result, only a small percentage of workers who retire under a DC pension plan convert their pension accumulation into an annuity. Using data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), for example, Hurd and Panis (2006) found that just 7 percent of respondents who retired under a DC plan converted their pension savings into an annuity. In contrast, nearly all DB pensions offer payouts in the form of life annuities. The shift of the private-sector pension system towards DC pensions has meant that a growing portion of workplace retirement savings is accumulated in a form in which the savings will not be automatically distributed to beneficiaries as annuities.
The decline of DB pensions and the associated drop in the fraction of workers who will automatically receive guaranteed income payments at retirement is viewed with alarm by many critics of U.S. workplace benefits programs. Jacob Hacker (2006) sees the drop in DB coverage as part of a great "risk shift" that has transferred the burden of dealing with economic insecurity from employers to workers and their families. Teresa Ghilarducci (2006) is one among many progressive critics of the U.S. pension system who charge that the shift to DC plans, especially voluntary 401(k) plans, has drastically reduced the retirement income security of American workers. One way in which risk has been shifted to workers and their income security reduced is by eliminating the option of converting workplace savings into a life annuity at retirement.
Components of income received by the aged
It seems reasonable to expect that the 35-year decline in enrollment in DB pension plans should have reduced the portion of retirement income received as annuities or annuity-like income flows, especially among recent retirees. In the remainder of this paper we examine data on the components of old-age income from two household survey files that should shed light on this question. The first is the Census Bureau's CPS, or Annual Social and Economic Supplement, which collects annual work experience and income data from a representative sample of U.S. households. The second is the Federal Reserve Board's SCF, whose main aim is to gather information on family wealth and its components and family borrowing and its components. The SCF interview also asks questions about family income in the past year.
These are similar to but less detailed than the income questions posed in the CPS. Unlike the CPS income survey, which is conducted every year, the SCF is conducted once every three years. Our analysis is limited to the calendar years for which complete and representative income data were available in the SCF (1982, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009 ). The surveys were conducted in the calendar year following the year for which income was ascertained. Since respondents were asked about their families' current wealth holdings and credit accounts, the net worth information in the SCF covers a somewhat later period than the income information.
For two reasons we should expect the CPS income data to be somewhat more precise than the income reports obtained in the SCF. As already noted, the CPS income questionnaire is more detailed than the one in the SCF. It asks respondents to report about more individual income items. Second, the CPS sample is considerably larger. In 2007, for example, the CPS sample was nearly nine times larger than the one interviewed in the SCF (57,000 versus about 6,500 respondents). On the other hand, the sampling strategy used in the SCF confers an important advantage for analyzing the incomes and balance sheets of high-income families. Part of the SCF sample is drawn using Internal Revenue Service tax return data, and this high-income sub-sample increases the fraction of the final sample consisting of high-net-worth families.
Neither survey provides flawless information about the amount and composition of income flowing into U.S. households. Except in households that receive only one kind of income, it may be difficult for respondents to recall all the types and amounts of income received by household members in the previous calendar year. As an aid to respondents' memories, the annual CPS income survey is conducted around the time that families file their annual income tax returns. Not every family is obliged to fill out these returns, however, and some kinds of money income, including means-tested government benefits, are not reported on tax returns.
Some regular sources of income, such as wages and Social Security, are much better reported in household surveys than income items that are more irregular or variable, such as dividends, selfemployment earnings, and unemployment compensation.
We have attempted to determine the quality of the income reported in the two surveys by comparing the aggregate totals reported with the totals shown in the U.S. national income and product accounts (NIPAs) or, in some cases, the IRS tax files. To make the comparisons we had to make adjustments to the NIPA estimates of personal income to align them more closely with the income concepts used in the CPS and SCF. The adjustments and some details of the comparison are described more fully in an appendix. Table 2 offers an incomplete picture of the shifting importance of annuities is that U.S. workers have been delaying their retirements and increasing their labor incomes over time (Bosworth and Burke 2012) . Considerable evidence suggests that retirement delays have been especially common among well-educated, highly compensated workers (Burtless 2013) .
Workers who still earn substantial labor incomes presumably do not need to supplement their earnings with annuity income. By delaying pension claiming they can increase the monthly payout rate of the pension they will ultimately receive.
In Table 3 we examine the distributional pattern of annuity income flows as a percentage of aged families' incomes. To perform this calculation we first ranked aged families according to their family-size-adjusted incomes and then divided the people who were members of the families into five equal groups according to their families' rank in the size-adjusted income distribution.
2 For each family we calculated the percentage of total family income consisting of annuitized income flows (Social Security, pensions, and annuities). We then calculated the mean percentage of annuitized income across families within a quintile. Note that this calculation assigns an equal weight to each family. Families with higher incomes are not assigned higher weights by virtue of their higher incomes, as is typically the case when analysts calculate income shares.
The results in Table 3 For the average family headed by a person 62 or older, two-thirds of total income consists of some form of annuitized income -Social Security, public or private employee pensions, or annuities. Aged families in the bottom two-fifths of the income distribution report a higher percentage of annuity income compared with families in the top three-fifths of the distribution.
In the higher ranks of the income distribution, annuitized income flows account for a progressively smaller percentage of total family income. Labor earnings and non-annuitized capital income flows are more important for high-income families. In both the CPS and SCF, the proportionate share of annuitized income in 2009 is almost identical to its average share in the previous eight survey years, and in every quintile the share is higher in 2009 than it was in the first survey year. The notable difference between the two surveys is the estimated importance of annuity income in the bottom quintile. In the CPS, annuitized income flows account for an average of 81 percent of family income; in the SCF, annuities account for 88 percent of total income. This difference is probably the result of SCF respondents' poor reporting of meanstested government benefits (which we do not count as annuitized income). The results in Table 3 thus offer little evidence the decline in private sector DB plans has led to a drop in the percentage of old-age income that is derived from annuitized income flows.
We believe these results are likely to understate the importance of annuitized income flows for most aged families. The calculations omit two forms of income that are increasingly important to Americans as they age. One is health insurance subsidies provided through employer-and government sponsored plans. The second is the flow of housing services that homeowners receive as occupants of a dwelling they own. Bureau has taken this approach to estimating the implicit income received by Americans enrolled in Medicare, Medicaid, and other public health insurance programs. It also estimates the net subsidy value of employer-provided health insurance, and adds that implicit income to the wage earnings of employees who report they are covered by an employer-sponsored health plan. In one of the Census Bureau's experimental income measures, these income amounts are added to money income to arrive at a more comprehensive measure of income for middle-and highincome families. In the case of lower income families, the Census Bureau adds the full value of employer-provided subsidies in workplace health plans to family income but only the "fungible value" of the government subsidies provided to enrollees in government health plans. 3 Under this measurement approach, the value of publicly subsidized health insurance is treated as zero for families with extremely low incomes and is treated as equivalent to the net government cost of provision for families with middle and high incomes. Families with moderately low incomes have only part of the cost of their public insurance subsidies included in their income.
Health insurance subsidies.
Most working-age Americans and their dependents obtain health insurance through an employer. The overwhelming share of this insurance is contingent on a worker's continued employment with the firm or government agency. When employment ceases, so does the employer's subsidy for health insurance. In contrast, Medicare is provided to nearly all Americans when they attain age 65, and it lasts until the insured person dies. Medicare insurance is thus equivalent to annuity income, while the subsidy in an employer-sponsored health plan is equivalent to wage income and is not an annuity. As U.S. health costs have soared and public and employer subsidies for health care have risen, these insurance subsidies have grown to represent a larger percentage of Americans' personal incomes (Burtless and Svaton 2010) .
In Table 4 , we show the implications of including the fungible value of health insurance subsidies in the incomes of CPS respondents. As in our earlier calculations, we first ranked aged families according to their family-size-adjusted incomes using the new and more comprehensive income measure, and we then divided the people who were members of aged families into five equal groups according to their families' rank in the size-adjusted income distribution. Home owners receive a flow of housing services as a result of home ownership that is not counted in the Census Bureau's money income statistics. In our view, this flow of services offers owners something more akin to a guaranteed income flow than to a variable flow of uncertain income. Ideally, we should measure the income flow by treating the home owner as a small business that receives a gross flow of income (linked to the monthly rent the business could obtain if the dwelling were leased) and that incurs operating expenses (tied to maintenance expenses, depreciation, property taxes, and borrowing costs if there is a mortgage on the home).
Neither the CPS nor the SCF obtains enough information about home owners' potential rent or expenses to estimate their net flow of housing services. The SCF, however, provides us with information about the value of occupants' homes and their remaining mortgage balance on the home. With this information we can obtain an alternative estimate of the flow of housing services. In particular, we can calculate the net asset value of the dwelling (its gross value less the remaining mortgage balance) and then multiply the net home equity by an appropriate interest rate. This is the procedure used by the Census Bureau when it imputes returns on net home equity to construct a comprehensive income measure. However, the CPS contains information on neither home values nor remaining mortgage balances, so these values must be imputed based on evidence from a different survey. The SCF, on the other hand, contains enough information to calculate the net return on home equity with tolerable accuracy. We use Moody's Corporate Bond Rate on securities rated AAA as the appropriate interest rate for calculation of returns on net home equity.
We show the implications of including returns on net home equity as a form of secure (or annuity-like) income in Table 5 . The additional income to homeowners adds to both total income and "secure income" by an identical amount. The top panel of Table 5 shows the average share of secure income in total old-age income for each income quintile and for the entire sample of aged families. The bottom panel shows the difference between the results in the top panel of the table and those in the bottom panel of Table 3 , which displays the same ratios for the SCF sample using the standard definition of money income.
The differences shown in the bottom panel suggest the proportional increase in secure income is largest for aged families at the top of the income distribution. These families are more likely to own costly homes. The increases in our estimates of secure income appear highly variable across years, which may seem ironical for an income flow we classify as "secure." The variability is due to our formula for calculating returns on net home equity. Both the price of American homes and the AAA bond rate have varied over time, almost certainly more than the flow of housing services from a fully-paid-for, owner-occupied home. As interest rates decline, our measure of returns on net home equity will fall, usually much faster than the rents on leased houses and apartments. Furthermore, the United States saw a boom followed by a bust in home values between 1994 and 2009. In many areas of the country home prices rose and then fell much faster than market rents on the same kinds of dwellings. From the perspective of a home owner who saw his dwelling first double in value and then fall in price by half, the rise and decline in home prices may have been associated with absolutely no change in the value of housing services enjoyed by the owner-occupant.
Despite the shortcomings of our measure of the flow of benefits from home ownership, the numbers displayed in the bottom panel of Table 5 imply that aged families in the bottom 80 percent of the income distribution receive income flows derived mainly from quite secure income sources -Social Security, pensions, annuities, and flows of services from a real asset that they own, their own homes. Moreover, the share of income derived from secure income sources has increased over time. In three of the five quintiles -all but the second and middle quintiles-the increases were sizeable.
The retired versus working aged. The results discussed so far average the experiences of all aged families, whether or not the head of family or the spouse of the head is still at work.
Some aged families contain an active worker who is not yet fully retired. In some cases, these workers bring home modest earnings. After working a long career in a full-time and possibly demanding job, the breadwinner may take a part-time, less arduous, and less well paid job as a segue into full retirement. The increase in old-age employment seen in the United States since the early 1990s has not been mainly in part-time or undemanding jobs, however. Evidence on weekly hours, labor income, and workers' job tenure suggests that much of the increase has been due to delays in retirement from full-time, career jobs (Burtless 2013) . And the increase in labor income is most notable among those at the top of the distribution, the most educated, and those who report that they enjoy working.
To determine how much the trend toward later retirement has affected our estimates, we divided aged families between those with and without a full-time working head. We classified all families in which a head was 75 or older as "retired." (Employment rates past age 75 are In Table 6 , we show results of our calculations when the sample of people in aged families is restricted to members of "retired" families. The estimates use the Census Bureau's definition of money income and are based on responses to the March CPS interviews. In the top panel we show trends in the share of money income received as Social Security, pensions, and annuities for these families. As with the calculations in Tables 3 through 5 , the results are broken down for families by their position in the income distribution. Even though the sample differs from the one used to estimate the percentages in the top panel of Table 3 , we do not change the quintile classification of the "retired" families who are retained for the analysis in Table 6 . The top panel of Table 6 shows trends in the percentage of total income that is derived from Social Security, pensions, and annuities in the retired families, and the lower panel shows the difference between these percentages and the comparable ones for the full sample of retired plus working aged families. The results suggest that among retired families the percent of income received from more secure or annuity-like income sources generally increased over the analysis period, especially among retired families in the top two quintiles. The lower panel of Table 6 shows, not surprisingly, that when working aged families are excluded from the sample, the estimated percentage of income derived from secure, annuity-like income sources increases, although by a small proportional amount for the families in the bottom two fifths of the old-age income distribution. The latter result is also unsurprising, since less than 5 percent of aged families in the bottom two quintiles have a head who works in a full-time job for at least half the year. In contrast, by 2009 slightly more than half the people in aged families in the top one-fifth of the old-age income distribution were members of a family with a full-time working breadwinner. When families with full-time breadwinners are excluded from the calculations, the remaining high-income families are seen to derive a high and rising percentage of their total money incomes from more secure, annuity-like income sources.
Even though our tabulations suggest that the mean share of income that consists of annuity-like income flows has remained high over the past three decades, especially among aged families in the middle and at the bottom of the income distribution and among those without a full-time worker, many observers worry that a minority of aged families face increased insecurity because their workplace savings was accumulated in a DC rather than a DB pension. 
Potential impact of greater annuitization
Even though we find little evidence aged families, especially fully retired families, have seen a noticeable drop in secure income flows such as pensions and annuities, it is reasonable to ask how much they could boost their secure incomes through annuitization of their financial wealth. To investigate the issue we used data in the SCF, which provides the most accurate available information on the distribution and components of financial wealth in the United
States. Since we are interested in the amount of additional annuitized income the family could obtain if it converted its net financial holdings into a stable annuity stream, the first analytical step is to subtract the family's current capital income flows from its available income. If all of its financial wealth is converted into an annuity, it will no longer receive interest, dividend, or rent payments. The second step is to calculate the total net wealth available for conversion into an annuity. We assume all stocks, bonds, mutual fund holdings, and bank deposits are available for conversion. In addition, we assume the family will convert its non-actively managed businesses and real estate holdings, except its primary residence, into an annuity. From those asset values we must subtract the family's current debt. The only debt a family retains is its mortgage and other loans on its principal residence and vehicles. We exclude the value of actively-managed businesses from the conversion.
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To calculate the annuity flow that would be generated by the sale of these assets, we use a simplified formula to calculate the annual annuity payment. The formula depends on whether the family purchases a single life annuity or a joint annuity. We assume aged families with a single head buy single life annuities while married couples buy joint annuities. After the first spouse dies we assume the surviving spouse receives an annual payment equal to two-thirds of the annual payment when both spouses are alive. The insurer's charge for the annuity then depends on the expected age-specific mortality rates of the annuitant and the spouse of the annuitant, the interest rate assumed by the insurer when it sells the annuity, and any fees charged by the insurer at the time of sale. We assume the insurer charges a fee equal to 15 percent of the purchaser's up-front capital payment. The remaining 85 percent of the capital payment buys a fair annuity. Age specific survivorship rates are derived from mortality tables prepared by the Social Security Actuary between 2002 and 2005. When an insurer sells an annuity we assume it expects to earn a real rate of return equal to the U.S. Treasury 10-year bond rate minus the expected inflation rate reported in the Blue Chip or Livingston inflation surveys. The simplifying assumptions needed to derive our pension cost estimates could undoubtedly be improved with a more elaborate model and better data. In particular, it is doubtful that insurers charge an identical fee -15 percent of the annuitant's up-front payment -t o customers, regardless of the amount of the annuity purchased. We believe, however, that our simulated annuity payouts provide a reasonable approximation to the income flows wealth owners could expect if they converted their holdings into an annuity. Table 7 show the impact on the average income within a quintile if families' positions in the income distribution are modified to reflect income changes caused by the annuitization of wealth. The two panels show different results (except in the right-hand column) because the families within each income quintile differ depending on whether their income rank is determined before or after income is annuitized.
In both the top and bottom panels, it is plain that annuitizing wealth boosts money income in all income quintiles. The percentage increase in money income caused by annuitization is typically larger in the higher income quintiles, especially if family income ranks are recalculated after wealth holdings have been converted into annuities. The sizeable income gains at the top of the distribution are due in part to the fact that high income recipients also tend to have large wealth holdings.
In Figure 5 , we present estimates from the SCF showing the distribution of annuity income shares over time with and without our hypothetical annuitization of household wealth. we restrict our analysis to aged families in the bottom two income quintiles, however, the effects of annuitizing families' financial wealth are quite small. Only a very small percentage of these families have any financial wealth to annuitize.
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The overall gains in potential income from annuitization are substantial. There are a number of possible explanations for this finding. The most obvious one is that annual payouts from annuitized wealth would provide higher income flows than the actual payouts wealth owners typically receive on their holdings. This explanation is clearly true in some cases. 6 However, many forms of wealth offer higher expected returns than an annuity contract, but they do not generate high annual income flows. Returns are produced in part by appreciation of the asset value rather than by interest, dividend, or rent payments. Since realized and unrealized appreciation of assets is not reported by wealth holders in the SCF or CPS interviews, this income flow is invisible in respondents' reports of their annual capital incomes. Thus, the tabulations displayed in Table 7 almost certainly overstate the income gains that wealth holders could obtain if they converted their financial wealth into an annuity. However, they may accurately indicate how much reported income flows would increase.
The results in Table 7 suggest that the percentage increase in income that could be obtained from annuitization has increased over time, especially in the middle of the income distribution. This finding may lend support to the idea that by accumulating savings outside DB pension programs and then failing to buy an annuity, workers are passing up the opportunity to obtain substantially higher and more secure incomes in old age. Nonetheless, there is little evidence in the bottom panel of Table 3 or in the top panel of Table 5 that aged SCF respondents 5 One reason retired workers in these low-income families have little wealth may be that they were enrolled in a DC plan and used all the funds in their retirement account before or soon after reaching retirement. It is ordinarily harder for workers vested in a DB plan to disburse their pension rights before leaving their pension-covered job. DB plans that offer lump-sum distributions at job exit may of course also permit workers to use up their retirement savings before reaching retirement. Thus, our finding that low-income families cannot derive a noticeable benefit from annuitizing their financial wealth sheds no direct light on the virtues or risks of DC versus DB plans. 6 Suppose we compare the annual payout rate from an annuity with that of the Treasury security that is held by the insurer selling the annuity. The Treasury security offers a payout rate that is determined by the yield on the bond at the time it was purchased by the insurer. The insurer can offer to make a higher annual payment than the yield on the bond because it is only making benefit payments to the annuitants who have survived to that year. Deceased annuitants do not receive any annuity payments, so their former shares of the interest payments and bond principal can be distributed to remaining survivors.
have experienced any drop in the share of their retirement incomes that is derived from secure, annuity-like income sources.
Explanations and conclusions
For a variety of reasons, private U.S. employers and a few public employers have shifted their workplace retirement programs away from DB pension plans and toward DC plans. Nearly all DB plans permit or even require workers retiring under the plan to obtain annuities that provide regular income as long as the retiree and a survivor spouse remain alive. This retirement income option is far less common in DC plans, and few DC plan participants who take lump-sum distributions from their plans appear to purchase life annuities available in the private market.
The ascendancy of DC plans and decline in pension coverage under DB plans should therefore have led to a falloff in the percentage of aged families' incomes that consists of traditional pensions or annuities.
Our analysis of the March CPS and SCF public use files has failed to produce much evidence of any falloff in the annuity-like income share. This is true when our income definition It is nonetheless something of a puzzle that DB pensions are disappearing from the private sector -which employs more than 5 out 6 Americans -without much detectable effect on the share of old-age income that is derived from a pension or annuity. In the remainder of the paper we will offer some possible explanations of the puzzle. Whatever the explanation for falling nominal yields, they influenced the measured income flows of retirees who invested their savings in very safe assets. Some of the decline in measured capital income flows recorded in Table 2 is undoubtedly traceable to this economic trend. Note that part of the decline in measured capital income flows is illusory. To the extent that part of the nominal yield compensates savers for their loss of real capital associated with inflation, we may not want to count it in estimating family income.
Impact of declining DB coverage is not yet visible in retirees'
Income mismeasurement. We have documented in Table 1 and an appendix the relationship between aggregate income reports in the CPS and SCF files and the benchmark totals of the same components of income in the national accounts and IRS tax records. Survey respondents are fallible, and they may have become more or less fallible over time. Our consistent finding that old families have not seen a drop in the share of their income that is annuitized might be the result of respondent reporting errors. Unfortunately, the most serious error may be traceable to the reporting of pensions and retirement account withdrawals. It should be clear to most retirees whether they receive regular benefit checks from a pension fund or annuity plan. In both the March CPS and SCF, respondents are only supposed to report those income items when they report pensions and annuities. However, retirees who receive regular 
Appendix: Survey Measures of Income
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The purpose of this appendix is to explain the methods that we used to benchmark the survey estimates of household income to corresponding measures in the national income accounts, and to report our evaluation of their correspondence over the period of 1982-2009. 8 There are several alternative sources of data that could be used as benchmarks of the survey estimates of particular types of income, such as income tax records, Social Security benefit payments, or employment records. We have chosen to rely on the national accounts because they provide consistent measures over time, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis has utilized all of the other available administrative data sources in trying to produce the most complete measures of income from current production. 9 However, it is also important to recognize that the survey definitions of income do not always equate with the concepts used in the national income and product accounts (NIPAs). Our approach is to adjust the data of the national accounts to match the concepts of the March CPS, now often referred to as the Annual Social and Economic Supplement, or ASEC. The CPS income concepts in turn closely correspond to those used in the SCF. The income data are grouped into four categories: (1) earnings, (2) capital income, (3) transfers, and (4) retirement benefits.
Our benchmark estimates of these income items, as well as their major components, based on the NIPAs and IRS tax files are displayed in the top panel of Appendix Table A1 . The second panel shows our estimates of the same income components based on interview responses in the March CPS, and the bottom panel shows comparable estimates based on data in the SCF files.
Earnings. The match between the NIPA and the CPS is straightforward, except for the treatment of the self-employment income from incorporated businesses. The CPS obtains two measures of earned income -main job and all other work. 10 In addition, the income for the main job can be identified for employees and the self-employed, with self-employed businesses being further divided into incorporated and unincorporated (sole proprietors, partnerships, and professional practice). The earnings of employees in their main job and income from other employers is classified as wage and salary income. In addition, it is important to note the mainjob income of the self-employed in incorporated businesses is also included in wage and salary income. Self-employment income is limited to workers who report income from an unincorporated business. In the case of other earnings from self-employment, no distinction is made between incorporated and unincorporated, and it is all allocated to self-employment income.
The measure of wage and salary income in the CPS began to depart from the concept of It is not clear, however, how S-corporation income is actually reported by respondents in the CPS. On income tax returns, S-corporation income is reported on schedule E along with income from partnerships and other forms of property income. It is distinct from schedule C, which is generally used for business income and loss. Census interviewers for the CPS are instructed not to ask for data from income tax forms, but if such data are offered by respondents, interviewers are instructed to classify schedule E income as business income rather than wage and salary income. In sum, it is not obvious how to derive an appropriate benchmark for income that is actually reported as "wage and salary income" in the CPS.
The classification of wage and salary income is straightforward for the SCF since there is a single question asking for this kind of income. Thus, the way wage and salary income is Differences in the wording of the questions about income by category also create problems for the comparison of the SCF and the CPS. Given concerns about the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated businesses in the CPS, it might seem reasonable to combine business income with wages in an overall earned-income measure. However, the structure of the questions in the SCF -specifically, the reference to Schedule E -creates ambiguity in the distinction between business and capital income, suggesting a grouping of those two components.
Finally, we adjust the NIPA data for difference in the universe of persons covered by the two statistical sources. The CPS and the SCF exclude the income of individuals who live in institutions, on military bases, overseas, or who die before the interview date. We use the population adjustment developed by Roemer (2000) and apply it as a ratio to the NIPA for years not covered by his study.
Capital income. For purposes of adjusting the NIPA to the concepts of the CPS, we distinguish among interest, dividends, and rental income. However, it is clear that the components should not be evaluated separately. When income passes through a financial intermediary, such as a mutual fund, it can easily be transformed from interest to dividend income.
The most significant issues for aligning capital income in the national accounts and the surveys arise from the role of fiduciary accounts where funds are managed for households by third parties. Payments to these accounts are included as part of personal income in the national accounts, yet individual households often have no specific knowledge of the income earned within the fiduciary accounts. Major examples of fiduciary accounts include pension and life insurance funds. The CPS and SCF focus on cash income received by households, ignoring the buildup of assets within fiduciary accounts. In addition, the national accounts include nonprofits as part of the household sector, and impute to households an income receipt for services furnished without charge by financial institutions. After excluding payments to fiduciary accounts and to nonprofits, only about a fourth of the NIPA measure of interest income and onethird of dividend income is included within the concept employed by the CPS.
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Transfers. Most government transfers of the CPS have their equivalents in the national accounts, and the detailed government accounts of the NIPAs makes the translation quite simple.
Important exceptions are the exclusion of Medicare, Medicaid, and food stamps from the basic money income measure of the CPS. These payments count as transfer income in the NIPAs, but they are excluded from the CPS concept of money income because they are in-kind payments.
On the other hand, the NIPAs have no counterparts to intra-household payments, such as child support, alimony, and inheritances. These items, which are included in the Census Bureau's concept of money income, are therefore excluded from the comparisons. The CPS asks far more detailed questions than the SCF about transfers. Since the SCF only asks about three broad categories, it is reasonable to expect a higher level of reported income on the CPS. We encountered more difficult problems in aligning the measures of pension income.
Both the CPS and the SCF focus on benefit payments as the relevant income measure, and both define these as "regular payments," as opposed to lump-sum withdrawals. In the NIPAs, pension funds are largely included within the household sector. 12 Thus, employer contributions to pension and life insurance accounts and the capital income of the accounts were part of personal income, whereas payments out of the funds are regarded as an intra-household transaction and excluded. The BEA does publish estimates of pension payments, but they include lump-sum distributions that may or may not be rolled over into other retirement accounts. 13 Ideally, the rollovers would be classified as a capital transfer and excluded from the measure of current personal income.
The Statistics of Income (SOI), prepared by the Internal Revenue Service using data reported on income tax returns, is an alternative source for pension data, and it distinguishes between total and taxable receipts, with the difference being attributed to rollovers and nontaxable (Sabelhaus and Weiner, 1999) . We opted to use the SOI measure of taxable pension income plus railroad retirement from the NIPA as our benchmark measure.
There is also considerable ambiguity as to what is being recorded in the CPS and the SCF surveys. For the CPS, we relied on Unicon data files. These report pension income as the sum of three components: survivor, disability, and retirement benefits. However, we adjusted those aggregates to move some payments under workers' compensation and black lung payments to transfers. For the SCF, we used the responses to a question about pension and disability 12 The national accounts were changed in 2013 to separate defined benefit plans into an accrual-based estimate of the income promised to workers and change in the value of the residual asset or liability of the pension administrator 13 The BEA data also specifically exclude IRAs, Keogh plans (employer) and Simplified Employee Plans (SEPs).
payments, which explicitly excludes IRA and Keogh plans. We make no distinction in our tabulations between retirement and disability. Note: The calculations show the share of total income that is annuitized by the 25th percentile family in the indicated income group of the aged population: 25% of families in the group have an annuity income share that is below the indicated amount, and 75% of families have an annuitized share that is above the indicated amount.
Source: Authors' calculations based tabulations of the March CPS files as explained in text. 
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Survey of Consumer Finances
Source: National accounts data are converted to CPS concepts of money income by the authors. The national accounts data are adjusted to exclude imputed income of pension funds and nonprofits serving households. S-Corporation income is included in capital income in the national accounts and in the SCF after 2001; it is largely reported as selfemployment income in the CPS. Fifths of the income distribution All families Difference compared with sample that includes working heads * We define a "working head" to be a head of family or the spouse of a head, under 75 years old, who worked more than half the calendar year in a full-time job. ** The quintile ranks of families are their original ranks, that is, their ranks when the sample included both working and retired heads.
Source: Authors' tabulations of March CPS files as explained in text. Bosworth, June 2015 
